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This essay presents the normative foundation of W.E.B. Du Bois’s constructivist 
theory of justice in four steps. First, I show that for Du Bois the public sphere in 
Anglo-European modern states consists of a dialectical interplay between 
reasonable persons and illiberal rogues. Second, under these nonideal 
circumstances, the ideal of autonomy grounds reasonable persons’ deliberative 
openness, an attitude of public moral regard for others which is necessary for 
constructing the terms of political rule in a public sphere. Third, though deliberative 
openness is the essential vehicle of construction, reasonable persons only have a 
pragmatic political obligation to forge ties of deliberative reciprocity with 
likeminded persons whom they trust will listen and not harm them. I present Du 
Bois’s defense of black suffragists’ support of the 19th Amendment to illustrate 
pragmatic political obligation in action. Finally, I sketch successful democratic 
engagement that reconstitutes a nonideal public sphere. 
 





Immanuel Kant and John Rawls are perhaps the best known exponents of political 
constructivism. Political constructivism rejects the view that there are natural moral facts and, 
instead, argues that deliberative agents must establish the terms of political rule using 
uncontroversial values that are “implicit” in the prevailing habits of political judgment, namely, 
“public reason.”1 Political constructivism articulates the normative basis of political judgment 
 
1 Rawls, John. “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 14.3 (1985): 223-51; Rawls, John. “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in Eckart 
Foerster (ed.). Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. p. 
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that all persons can agree is objectively reasonable, despite intractable disagreement about 
conceptions of the good in a pluralistic modern society.2 It treats consensus about political rule as 
a solution to the problem of living together well. Because ordinary persons authorize their 
binding normative force, public reasons are epistemically accessible and motivating for all, and 
provide an appropriate conception of objectivity.3 If for whatever reason persons forego the 
requisite exercise of political judgment, then the public sphere degenerates and justice becomes 
impracticable. The key of political constructivism is, then, a conception of reasonable 
deliberative agency that is thin enough to appeal to the public’s sense of justice, and yet 
sufficiently robust to ground fair and mutually acceptable terms of political rule. A viable 
constructivist theory of justice presupposes that the deliberative capacity of reasonable persons 
functions as a reliable engine of progress. 
Notwithstanding its crucial function, political constructivists neglect to provide a 
plausible account of the nature and emergence of reasonable deliberative agency in profoundly 
nonideal circumstances. For example, Rawls holds that “in normal social circumstances” or 
under “reasonable conditions” persons have an “effective desire to comply with existing rules 
and to give one another that to which they are entitled [as persons] of equal moral worth.”4 Like 
 
95. See also O’Neill, Onora. Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics, and Interpretation in 
Kant’s Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Chp. 4. 
2 O’Neill, Constructing Authorities, pp. 69-71. 
3 Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. p. 89. 
4 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. pp. 41-
42, pp. 274-75; Political Liberalism, pp. xx-xxi.  
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Rawls, Kant sketches a speculative theory of moral education, suggesting that the historical 
development of the human species has shaped our natural capacity for judgment. In essence, 
political constructivism simply postulates the practical efficacy of the public use of reason. But 
such a postulate hardly seems tenable in our world, the “normal” social circumstances of which 
are dysfunctional and inegalitarian. One might dogmatically insist on the transcendental 
normativity of reason, which obtains regardless of whether or not any particular person 
recognizes it. Still the constructivist approach necessitates that the terms of political rule are 
epistemically accessible and motivating for all. Pointing to the history of racial terror in the U.S., 
even sympathetic critics of liberalism note that not only are existent institutional arrangements 
unjust, but the American people seldom meet a minimal standard of reasonable judgment, 
particularly with respect to racial matters. It is therefore unclear whence reasonable deliberative 
agency can emerge to indicate that the prospect of justice is not a lost cause for the American 
people.5 
All is not lost. Philosophers must, however, look elsewhere for a viable constructivist 
theory of justice. The Africana philosopher and social scientist W.E.B. Du Bois dedicates his 
scholarship to cultivating a sense of justice in the American people. During the Jim Crow era, Du 
Bois appeals to Americans’ capacity to cooperate. He underscores that we can together advance 
an ideal of justice to overcome systematic racist misrecognition and the dominance of white-
 
5 The branch of Africana philosophy of Afro-pessimism posits that the prospect of racial 
justice in the U.S. is not viable in the light of anti-black state violence. For a philosophical 
treatment of the topic, see Gordon, Lewis R., et. al. “Afro-pessimism,” Contemporary Political 
Theory 17 (2018): 105-37. 
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controlled capital. Though he aims to vindicate the moral power of democratic reason, the 
political constructivist tradition has completely ignored his work. Be that as it may, he develops 
a promising alternative constructivist approach to theorizing justice whose moral groundwork I 
lay out here.6 
In this chapter, I argue that Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice provides a unique 
account of the grounds and emergence of reasonable deliberative agency. Du Bois argues that 
reasonable deliberative agents must assert an ideal of autonomy, which reimagines the polity as a 
universal moral community of free and equal who can each legislate the binding terms of 
political power. Specifically, the ideal of autonomy grounds the attitude of deliberative openness 
of reasonable persons. However, reasonable deliberative agents pragmatically exercise political 
power to build ties of deliberative reciprocity with likeminded persons whom they trust will 
listen and not harm them. 
In Section I, I define reasonable deliberative agency and explain that for Du Bois the 
public sphere in Anglo-European states consist of a dialectical interplay between the many 
illiberal rogues and the few reasonable persons. In Section II, I ground the value of deliberative 
openness in the ideal of autonomy. Rather than take it for granted, Du Bois holds that reasonable 
 
6 To my knowledge, there is no publication about Du Bois’s constructivism. My 
presentation of Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice is inspired by Melvin Lee Rogers’s 
defense of Du Bois’s “aspirational” notion of “the people” and Charles Mills’s interpretation of 
Du Bois as a ‘black radical liberal.’ See Rogers’ “The People, Rhetoric, and Affect: On the 
Political Force of Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk,” American Political Science Review 106.1 
(2012): 188-203 and Mills’s  
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persons struggle to introduce deliberative openness as a rationally-binding norm in a 
dysfunctional public sphere. In Section III, I defend a pragmatic political obligation that 
mitigates the risk vulnerable persons incur by entering a hostile public sphere. I take as a case 
study Du Bois’s defense of the passage of the 19th Amendment in Darkwater to show pragmatic 
political obligation in action. Finally, in Section IV, I illustrate what the practical success of 
democratic engagement means for Du Bois. The irony is not lost on him that precisely those who 
are the least respected and most vulnerable often do the most—at the greatest sacrifice—to 
reconstitute a nonideal public sphere. 
In closing my introduction, I briefly comment on method and scope. First, with respect to 
method, I offer a rational reconstruction of the normative foundation of Du Bois’s critique of 
American democracy, clarifying its basic ideals. For Du Bois, poetry and the arts are also 
relevant, though I do not discuss them here. This is not to minimize poetry and the arts—or even 
to posit that deliberative democracy is most effective for advancing justice. Rather, given that 
philosophers have yet to engage his theory of justice at all—or to notice that he has one—I begin 
by establishing his constructivist commitments. I save for another time his treatment of the arts 
as propaganda, as well as his polemic with the founder of the Harlem Renaissance, Alain Locke.7 
Second, with respect to scope, I propose an ambitious project. I limit the scope of this chapter to 
establishing the theoretical core of his constructivist approach, focusing on the democratic 
construction of the public moral authority of political judgment, which I argue rests on an ideal 
 
7 For further discussion, see Harris, Leonard. “The Great Debate: Alain L. Locke vs. 
W.E.B. Du Bois,” Philosophia Africana 7.1 (2004): 13-37. 
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of autonomy. I address in later chapters the substantive content of political judgment, as it relates 
to Du Bois’s defense of redistribution, unions, and reparations. 
 
I. What is a Reasonable Deliberative Agent? 
 
W.E.B. Du Bois does not propose principles of justice in a philosophical treatise. If one is 
inclined to be charitable to philosophers writing in the constructivist tradition, this is perhaps 
why they have ignored him. But his neglect to propose principles is instructive for reimagining a 
viable constructivist theory of justice. His constructivist theory of justice begins with a 
conception of reasonable deliberative agency, that is how actual persons reason about justice and 
act towards its practical realization, rather than first principles that might derive from a 
hypothetical decision procedure or thought experiment. On his approach, a moral conception of 
persons is essential to the idea of justice, for it explains the key features of reasonable 
deliberative agency and locates those features in ordinary persons’ capacity for judgment. The 
‘bindingness’ of norms is constructed through the deliberation of practical agents. The impetus 
of progress is the people’s democratic engagement, whose normative authority validates public 
norms, rather than a philosophical treatise. The philosophical reconstruction of principles is 
never the source of progress, even if it vindicates the ‘absolute’ epistemic or moral worth of a 
standard of judgment. For better or worse, philosophers do not have a special normative 
authority as deliberative agents.8 Du Bois instead identifies the people’s habits of democratic 
 
8 Cf. Basevich, Elvira. “The Function of the Philosopher and the Public in Du Bois’s 
Political Thought,” Australasian Philosophical Review (forthcoming). 
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reasoning with the advance—or the regress—of an ideal of justice.9 
Du Bois’s theory of justice models a deliberative procedure to disrupt prevailing habits of 
judgment. In other words, he hopes to teach Americans how to choose and enact public joint 
commitments that rectify systematic racial exclusion and white supremacist value systems in 
social and political life. He charts the emergence of a people’s robust sense of reasonable 
deliberative agency in the face of their flawed public institutions and unequal social relations. 
The advance of fair and reciprocal terms of political rule reflects the intersubjective discursive 
relations in the public sphere. To be sure, the normative authority of the people relies on a 
prescriptive theory of democratic reason: the reasons persons offer should be intelligible, 
actionable, and universalizable. Reasons are neither deflationary nor relativistic. Rather all 
persons should adopt them, once their use of reason is constrained in the right ways by a 
procedure that upholds the moral authority of all persons to influence democratic decision-
making.10 
 
9 Du Bois, W.E.B. Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil. Mineola: Dover, 1999. pp. 
81-92. At best, philosophers can suggest decision-making procedures and standards of public 
judgment to guide the public use of reason or public moral perception. See also Richardson, 
Henry S. Articulating the Moral Community: Towards a Constructivist Ethical Pragmatism. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 41-48. 
10 In Chapter 2, I defend Du Bois’s deliberative procedure of “the method of excluded 
groups” from Darkwater to establish and ground democratic norms in a nonideal modern society 
with a history of racial exclusion. Here I focus on the crucial background assumptions that frame 
his theory of justice: namely, the idea of moral persons, the public sphere, and political 
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For Du Bois, the essential feature of reasonable persons is the attitude of deliberative 
openness. In The Souls of Black Folk, he writes: “Honest and earnest criticism from those whose 
interests are most nearly touched,—criticism of writers by readers, of government by those 
governed, of leaders by those led,—this is the soul of democracy and the safeguard of modern 
society.”11 A reasonable deliberative agent adopts a public attitude of moral regard for others, 
such as a willingness to listen to others and to treat others as agents capable of acting for reasons. 
They identify the members of their political community as civic fellows who might share an 
interest in fair political rule for its own sake. Their social cooperation should, with time, cultivate 
a disposition to engage, and advocate for, each other. Reasonable deliberative agents aspire to 
actualize the free and equal standing of their civic fellows.  
Unfortunately, with the exception of Du Bois, constructivists neglect to explain from 
whence such a robust sense of justice emerges in nonideal circumstances. Consider that how 
constructivists portray the public sphere reflects their justification of the idea of reasonable 
persons. For example, Rawls asserts that his conception of reasonable persons is “elicited” from 
our “shared moral experience” in “normal social circumstances” or under “reasonable 
conditions.”12 For Rawls, persons are reasonable inasmuch as that is what their public political 
culture is already like.13 The idea of the reasonable is therefore “implicit” in public political 
culture. So too Kant posits that though Anglo-European constitutional republics are not 
 
obligation. 
11 Du Bois, Souls, p. 36. 
12 Rawls, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” pp. 98-99.  
13 Cf. O’Neill, Constructing Authorities, p. 92. 
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enlightened, they are nonetheless in an age of enlightenment and at least partially exemplify 
what he calls in the Metaphysics of Morals “the idea of public right.”14 The pure principle of 
right shapes political modernity. That is not to say that modern states do not have a long way to 
go still, yet for the most part yet for the most part, Kant and Rawls consider the public sphere to 
be bounded by constitutional norms. 
Conversely, on the Rawlsian and Kantian models, the public use of reason is meaningless 
in the context of failed or dysfunctional states, which they equate with the state of nature. Any 
attempt to assert public normative authority would fall outside the purview of a public sphere 
and would be a hapless endeavor in a society collapsing back into the state of nature.15 For the 
public use of reason requires, well, a public; and for that matter, a functional public sphere 
whose members and institutions are somewhat sensible in their recognitive practices. In the 
absence of such a public and a functional public sphere, it would be as if a reasonable person 
asserts herself into “the universal void”—to borrow a line from the Soviet poet Osip 
Mandelstam.16 In sum, the Rawlsian and Kantian variants of political constructivism assume that 
 
14 Kant, Immanuel. “What is Enlightenment?” in Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. pp. 54-60. p. 58.  
15 Kant argues that political judgment is unintelligible in a state of nature devoid of 
justice. Only under rightful conditions can persons stand in a public relation to each other, 
making politics possible as something other than the mere illegitimate assertions of private 
interests. 
16 Mandelstam, Osip. “We Shall Meet Again in Petersburg,” in Mandelstam: Selected 
Poems. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1975. pp. 68-71. “Extinguish then our candles if 
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a reasonable, rather than a simple, pluralism defines Anglo-European constitutional states. 
Reasonable pluralism is the outcome of the public use of reason under institutional arrangements 
that protect deliberative reciprocity in the public sphere. A reasonable plurality might hold 
incompatible conceptions of the good, but nonetheless agree about constitutional essentials to 
motivate a shared practical interest in advancing the public good. An unreasonable people, 
however, constitute a simple plurality.17 A simple plurality rejects the essential features of a 
modern constitutional regime and lacks a practical interest in constraining their judgment and 
action on the basis of shareable reasons.  
On my view, Du Bois theorizes the discursive advance of an ideal of justice inasmuch as 
the American people are largely a simple plurality and public institutions are dysfunctional and 
inegalitarian. Whether out of ill will, indifference, or ignorance, the American people have 
failed—and will likely continue to fail—in the public use of their reason, particularly with 
respect to racial matters.18 Yet he refuses to concede that democratic reason is impotent and 
justice is a lost cause for the American people. He maintains that an attitude of deliberative 
openness defines what it means to be a reasonable person with a robust sense of justice. The 
upshot is that he theorizes how the American people can discursively construct an ideal of justice 
inasmuch as they are largely illiberal rogues and have failed—and will likely continue to fail—in 
 
you will / in the black velvet of the universal void. / Still the steep shoulders of blessed women 
sing / and you will not notice the nocturnal sun.” Mandelstam dies in the winter of 1938 in a 
labor camp. 
17 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xxx. 
18 Du Bois, Radical Reconstruction, pp. 674-79. 
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the public use of their reason. Following Kant and Rawls, constructivists agree that in the 
circumstances Du Bois confronts we cannot construct a viable ideal of justice. To put it bluntly, 
they believe that what Du Bois proposes is impossible. In contrast, Du Bois submits that if 
justice is ever realizable in the U.S., then we must confront the polity for what it really is and 
figure out where to go from there. 
Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice, I submit, entails novel characterizations of the 
nature of (1) the public sphere and (2) political obligation to showcase the potential discursive 
advance of justice in profoundly nonideal polities such as the U.S. First, with respect to Du 
Bois’s account of the nature of the public sphere, at least two kinds of persons enter it: the 
reasonable deliberative agent and the illiberal rogue who constitutes a simple plurality. Though 
the illiberal rogue tends to control public conversation, Du Bois argues that reasonable persons 
still uphold deliberative reciprocity, even when others do not and democratic institution appear 
to collapse into mere shams. He demonstrates that the public use of reason can be practically 
effective, as the few reasonable deliberative agents assert their voices into “the universal void” of 
the many illiberal rogues, so to speak. He thereby rethinks what it means to make public use of 
reason under the peculiar conditions of Anglo-European political modernity. To wit, he 
demonstrates that in the formal public sphere there is a dialectical interplay between the 
reasonable and the illiberal (hereon referred to as DIRI), and it is on the basis of this interplay 
that the advance—or the regress—of deliberative reciprocity occurs.19 
 
19 To be clear: Du Bois countenances America is a modern state, in spite of its treatment 
of communities of color. He tracks the social ontology of public reason to discern how it might 
become a formidable countervailing force in democratic politics: “The democracy that the white 
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Second, with respect to the nature of political obligation, in their treatment of failed or 
dysfunctional states, Kant and Rawls appeal to the so-called ‘natural’ duty of persons to exit the 
state of nature and to establish a just constitutional regime. However, they offer no systematic 
account of the nature of political obligations in nonideal circumstances, in which one cannot trust 
one’s civic fellows to enact public joint commitments. On the one hand, Kant ignores the 
disastrous impact of the refusal of others to cooperate.20 On the other hand, Rawls paradoxically 
argues that political obligations are voided by others’ bad behavior. One only pursues justice, so 
long as others are prepared to do the same. Otherwise, one need not act to further “just 
institutional arrangements not yet established, at least when this [action invites] too much cost to 
ourselves.”21 Rawls continues, “for while we have a natural duty to bring about a great good, say 
 
world seeks to defend does not exist.” The U.S. has a greater potential for democratic 
development than, say, present-day Russia or Indonesia, in which journalists and opposition 
leaders are imprisoned and subject to extra-judicial killings. The circumstances of DIRI therefore 
stand in contradistinction to outright illiberal states. Du Bios, Dusk of Dawn in W.E.B. Du Bois. 
New York: The Library of America, 1986. p. 677. 
20 Highlighting this weakness in Kant’s model of reform, O’Neill submits that if 
institutions are “not knave-proof, it helps to not have too many knaves around.” Towards Justice 
and Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 187. 
21 Colleen Murphy proposes a scheme of political obligations that arise in unstable 
circumstances. I am sympathetic to her position, but on my view DIRI circumstances are the 
circumstances of justice as such and not limited to periods of historical crisis: 
[T]here are four circumstances of transitional justice. These are widely recognized as 
characteristic of paradigm transitional societies: pervasive structural inequality, 
normalized collective and political wrongdoing, serious existential uncertainty, and 
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if we can do so relatively easily, we are released from his duty when the cost to ourselves is 
considerable.”22 In stark contrast, Du Bois offers a unique conception of political obligation 
under DIRI circumstances, which identifies not reasonableness, but risk as a defining feature of 
the public sphere, at least for members of vulnerable groups. Reasonable deliberative agents are 
often forced to address would-be interlocuters who refuse to recognize their normative authority 
and might wish to destroy their physical bodies. As I explain below, he defends the pragmatic 
pursuit of deliberative openness and shows how such a reasonable attitude can still disrupt the 
longstanding poor use of reason by illiberal rogues. 
One might object that the public political culture in the U.S. is not characterized by 
simple, rather than reasonable, pluralism. Though there have been serious problems, one might 
maintain that on the whole public institutions work as they should and that constitutional norms 
protect persons. Yet, if we assume with Du Bois, as I think we must, that American public 
political culture is, indeed, illiberal, particularly with respect to racial matters, then we need to 
reimagine the viable construction of the terms for political rule and political obligation under 
radically different circumstances than most philosophers are prepared to imagine.23 In line with 
 
fundamental uncertainty about authority. Societies are transitional when these four 
circumstances of justice obtain. By contrast, the circumstances of justice obtaining in 
stable democracies are limited structural inequality, deviant individual and personal 
wrongdoing, minor existential uncertainty, and narrow uncertainty about authority.  
 
In The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017. p. 27, p. 41. 
22 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 100; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 129. 
23 Others have attempted to explain that the idea of public reason is “realistic.” After all, 
pressing whether the prospect of justice is viable is not novel, but confronting the extent to which 
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the Africana philosophical tradition from Frederick Douglass to Charles Mills, Du Bois argues 
that the black historical perspective on modern American society—through which black and 
brown Americans perceive the U.S. “darkly, as through a veil”—constitutional norms remain, at 
best, nominal rather than a substantive practical force for immigrant, working poor, and black 
and brown communities.24 For Du Bois, we cannot take for granted that democratic institutions 
will work as they should for members of these vulnerable groups. To be sure, this is an empirical 
observation that he supports with rigorous social scientific and historical evidence.25 Yet a sound 
 
it is compromised from the black historical perspective is. Freeman, Samuel. “Public Reason and 
Political Justifications,” Fordham Law Review 72.5 (2004): 2021-72. p. 2071; Gilabert, Pablo. 
“Justice and Feasibility: A Dynamic Approach,” in M. Weber and K. Vallier (eds.) Political 
Utopias: Contemporary Debates. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. pp. 95-126; Fung, 
Archon. “Deliberation Before the Revolution: Towards an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in 
an Unjust World,” Political Theory 33.2 (2005): 397-419.  
24 Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
pp. 11-32. Gooding-Williams, Robert. In the Shadow of Du Bois. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011. pp. 15-18; Mills, Charles. “W. E. B. Du Bois: Black Radical Liberal,” in 
Nick Bromell (ed.), A Political Companion to W.E.B. Du Bois. Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2018. pp. 19-56. 
25 In particular, Du Bois views the triumph of the Southern “redemption” movement that 
dismantled the state constitutions and federal policies of Radical Reconstruction as deforming 
the moral character of the postbellum republic: “It was a triumph of men who in their effort to 
replace equality with caste and to build inordinate wealth on a foundation of abject poverty have 
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empirical appraisal of public political culture is crucial for a viable constructivist theory of 
justice precisely because a viable constructivist theory of justice is supposed to disrupt prevailing 
habits of judgment. Philosophers can then demonstrate that meaningful progress is possible in 
the circumstances in which we actually find ourselves. Yet philosophers downplay—to the point 
of willful denial—that the prevailing habits of judgment obstruct deliberative reciprocity in the 
public sphere.26 
  
II. How to Reason with the Void: Grounding the Attitude of Deliberative Openness in 
a Dysfunctional Public Sphere 
 
On the July 4th weekend in 2020, Vauhxx Booker, an African-American Human Rights 
Commissioner in Monroe County, Indiana was the victim of an attempted lynching at Lake 
Monroe, near Bloomington. On a radio program, he details the assault: 
So, a friend and I went down to see if we could just talk to some of these folks and build 
a rapport and reason. The conversation was going well. Then this gentleman with the 
Confederate flag hat on […] joined. He quickly became belligerent. We felt a situation 
developing, so we just simply walked away. 
 
A few moments later, as we were walking away, I heard footsteps quickly approaching. 
This man came at me and swung his fist at me. Another gentleman came. So, I was on the 
ground with them. A third gentleman came. We tussled for a moment. Two more men 
came. And from there, they were able to pin and drag my body to this tree and put their 
bodyweight on me. 
 
 
succeeded in killing democracy, art, and religion.” Black Reconstruction. New York: The Free 
Press, 1992. p. 707. 
26 The notion that the U.S. is ‘decently’ liberal is not taken seriously in Africana 
philosophy, marking a significant departure from mainstream analytic political philosophy, 
which Charles Mills aptly describes as “white-stream” in Black Rights/White Wrongs. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017. pp. 206-9. 
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[…] It was scary. […] People just started coming to my defense. They yelled at the man 
to let me go. They came forward as these men pushed them away or swatted at them. 
 
There was a moment where I hear a lady yell out, “Don’t kill him!” And it’s a moment 
where you realize that you’re hearing your own potential death being narrated in front of 
you, and you have to be aware of George Floyd and how many other Black folks in our 
history have heard their executions spoken before them in real time.27 
 
Booker relates his initial desire to establish a “rapport” and to “reason” with the white men who 
in the course of their conversation became belligerent. Sensing their hostility, he attempts to 
walk away before he is attacked. The intervention of passersby likely prevented his murder. His 
initial attitude of deliberative openness and the violence that he experiences capture what I take 
to be the essential features of the way Du Bois rethinks democratic deliberation under DIRI. In 
this section, I explain why under these circumstances political judgment must rest on an ideal of 
autonomy, which grounds the attitude of deliberative openness. In the next section, I defend Du 
Bois’s pragmatic conception of political obligation for engaging hostile interlocuters. 
But first a clarification is in order. In using the example above to frame my discussion, I 
do not mean to imply that for Du Bois all potential public encounters in the U.S. break out into 
racist violence. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate if not the outright violence of 
 
27 There are numerous illustrations of what I identify as DIRI circumstances in Du Bois’s 
writings. Perhaps best known, in Souls, Du Bois depicts the lynching of a young black teacher, 
John Jones, by a white mob. In the next section, I focus on Du Bois’s discussion of black 
suffragists campaign for racial equity in the women’s movement. I present here Vauhxx 
Booker’s first-person account of his recent ordeal to show the promise of Du Bois for theorizing 




American public life, then that its threat remains live for participants of color.28 Moreover, 
indifference and ignorance about racial matters are sufficient to exert the kind of illiberal force 
that Du Bois believed upheld the racial caste regime of the antebellum and the Jim Crow eras. In 
other words, there remains a strong tendency to condone racist violence among those who are not 
active participants in it. 
Additionally, one might object that DIRI is not about democratic reasoning at all. Indeed, 
as in Booker’s case, we see the failure of any conversation to take place. Violence and its 
omnipresent threat are the death of reason. Yet confronting the prospective death of reason in our 
polity is what Du Bois asks of us. Robert Gooding-Williams and Danielle Allen assert that in a 
public sphere that demands black deference in the light of anti-black violence—or its threat—
what is called for is nothing less than the “radical reconstruction of habits of citizenship.”29 
Under reasonable pluralism, an attitude of deliberative openness is part of the unreflective 
acceptance of the practical and epistemic rules that frame democratic deliberation; they are not 
 
28 In the spirit of Du Bois’s historical sociology, the premise requires empirical 
confirmation. Philosophical analyses of democratic deliberation should reflect our actual 
circumstances, if philosophers are to be a helpful guide. In the protests against the police 
lynching of George Floyd, protestors have been run over by vehicles, subject to beatings and 
arbitrary arrests, and lost body parts, including the journalist Blake Balin whose eye was shot out 
by a teargas cannister. Of course, the de facto vulnerability of the black and brown communities 
to state and white vigilante violence is the reason for the protests. 
29 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, pp. 191-97; Allen, Danielle. Talking to 
Strangers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. pp. 6-8. 
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themselves subject to public scrutiny. However, because Du Bois cannot take for granted the 
deliberative openness of others, democratic agents are tasked with asserting its value. Booker’s 
inclination to even talk to the group of white men showcases that he is, in fact, assuming the 
daunting task of reconstituting the public sphere. And yet we must ask with Du Bois, on what 
basis might one try to reason with a void pregnant with violence?  
For Du Bois, in DIRI circumstances, deliberative openness must be, to use Barbara 
Herman’s term, “didactic”: it is meant to instruct others about the value that should anchor 
complex moral deliberation.30 Though Herman’s concern is with whether or not morality has 
content, her overview of what makes moral deliberation didactic is helpful for plotting the 
radical reconstruction of a dysfunctional public sphere. She claims that we need “a grounding 
conception of value [that] could […] offer an explanation of the wrong- or right-making 
characteristics of action that renders moral requirements intelligible in a way that is then able to 
guide deliberation.”31 For democratic reason to reconstitute an existent order of values, a 
deliberative agent introduces a conception of value that makes intelligible the very idea of what 
democratic life, ideally, ought to be like. Such a grounding conception of value fashions an 
objective standard through which ordinary people—even illiberal rogues—can distinguish right 
from wrong by using their own capacity for reason. 
I submit that for Du Bois the value of deliberative openness shapes all other public values 
and commitments.32 Without it, the very prospect of justice is impossible. It is akin to the liberal 
 
30 Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, pp. 216-17.  
31 ibid, p. 216. 
32 Herman argues that intersubjective relations shape the “substantive core” of a person’s 
“conception of herself as a moral agent,” which involves learning “preprocedural” rules 
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principle of legitimacy: to advance, consider, and accept the reasonable claims of others in a 
democratic attitude of deliberative openness and to reject unreasonable claims and institutional 
arrangements that undermine civic equality. Booker approaches the men prepared to explain 
what matters to him and why because deliberative openness constitutes the means and the final 
end of public life.33 His attitude is required to establish any terms of political rule. In the absence 
of a shared commitment to deliberative openness, the terms of political rule have no vehicle for 
its establishment and actualization.  
But how does deliberative openness also provide a standard of political judgment that 
demonstrates what one ought to do and why being an illiberal rogue is bad? It is one thing to say 
that it provides a grounding conception of value that makes democratic life practically possible; 
 
for picking out the moral salience of the social world. One acquires this skill through moral 
practice to discern, among other things, who has moral value and what sorts of activities inflict 
or repair moral injury. Practices of Moral Judgment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993. pp. 86-93 & Moral Literacy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. pp. 130-53. See 
also Dean, Moyar. Hegel’s Ethical Conscience. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. pp. 
166-72; Moran, Kate. “Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?,” Journal of Philosophy 
of Education 43.4 (2009): 471-84. 
33 “This [abolition] philosophy of freedom was a logical continuation of the freedom 
philosophy of the eighteenth century which insisted that Freedom was not an End but an 
indispensable means to the beginning of human progress and that democracy could function only 
after the dropping of feudal privileges, monopoly and chains.” Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 
20. 
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it is quite another to say it is the moral value that presents a standard worth following for 
everyone. Presumably, from the ancient Greeks to republican constitutionalism to radical 
feminist communes, there can be all sorts of ways of doing democratic politics. One appeals, 
respectively, to a landed, slave-owning gentry, full-time civil servants, or a distinct sect to 
spearhead deliberation. But for Du Bois one pursues deliberative openness as a properly public 
value that is constrained by the universal form that political judgment ought to take.34 For him, 
deliberative openness provides a normative standard on the basis of which all persons can 
influence democratic decision-making, given a practical interest in learning to live together well 
and to share the surface of the earth.  
Du Bois thus asserts that reasonable deliberative agency is grounded in a universal ideal 
of autonomy inasmuch as it reconceives all persons as ideal legislators in a prospective moral 
community. In other words, one does not just freely make assertions for the sake of freely 
making random assertions. In a democracy, by reconceiving all others as ideal legislators—even 
when they are plainly not acting as such—one works to introduce reasons to which others can 
assent and thereby amplify deliberative reciprocity in an otherwise toxic public sphere.35 This 
 
34 Under the circumstances of reasonable pluralism, public institutions, not persons, are 
primarily responsible for protecting the integrity of the public sphere public and are the subjects 
of justice. 
35 Japa Pallikkathayil defends “responsiveness” in intractable disagreement, but does not 
address the deeper problem of grounding the moral value of responsiveness in nonideal 
circumstances. See her “Disagreement and the Duties of Citizenship,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 56.1 (2019): 71-82.  
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attitude makes it practically possible to pursue the final end of public life, but it also makes it 
possible to restructure the public sphere on fair terms all can accept, which Du Bois identifies 
with the discursive advance of justice. 
I affirm that grounding deliberative openness in the ideal of autonomy illustrates at least 
three important features of Du Bois’s constructivist approach: 
1. The ideal of autonomy reconceives all persons as ideal legislators, regardless of 
whether or not they are full members of the formal public sphere. To wit, political judgment 
must achieve a universal scope that extends beyond who is considered a full member of the 
public sphere as it now stands. One thereby not only acts as if illiberal rogues can in principle 
change their minds, however unlikely, but more importantly, one addresses excluded persons. 
Even if they are not respected members of the political community, which incidentally might 
include one’s own self, one offers reasons for those who are not there. Du Bois thus often muses 
that we must vindicate the humanity of those who died at the hands of lynching bees or enslaved 
on plantations and never had the chance to speak for themselves.36 One proposes reasons that 
“the crankiest, humblest, poorest, and blackest peoples” would find acceptable and fair.37 
Furthermore, by underscoring the ideal of autonomy, one does not seek to compromise with 
 
36 Democratic politics should “redeem” past losses. Cf. Frank Kirkland’s Du Boisian 
proposal to retrieve a “future-past unfulfilled.” The “future-past” Kirkland refers to is a vision of 
the future encapsulated by the dreams of black generations, a future that was supposed to deliver 
the hopes of enslaved Africans. See his “Modernity and Intellectual Life in Black,” The 
Philosophical Forum 24.1-3 (1993): 136-65. pp. 159-60. 
37 Du Bois, Darkwater, p. 88. 
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one’s current interlocuters, as much as one seeks to reconstitute the public sphere by introducing 
and foregrounding new voices who are prepared to assume the formidable obligations of public 
life. 
2. If one cannot take for granted one’s public standing, one is often forced to withdraw 
from the public sphere. In spite of his initial openness, Booker withdraws once he senses that his 
would-be interlocutors are resolved to become his would-be murderers. Yet an attitude of 
deliberative openness might still foster public encounters elsewhere in informal or quasi-formal 
associations. After all, deliberative openness is an attitude based on a value one actively pursues. 
In concreto it motivates one to integrate one’s life and self-conception. Of course, one should not 
settle for an imagined sense of personal power in lieu of meaningful political change. Rather, one 
asserts one’s self-conception as an effective deliberative agent, whose normative authority is 
recognized by likeminded others. Such persons intervened to save Booker’s life. To be sure, Du 
Bois considers the modern constitutional state to be essential for the advance of justice, but his 
conception of democratic practice fosters the ideal of autonomy well beyond the formal public 
sphere. For any dysfunctional public sphere will be poorly defined inasmuch as it lacks the 
institutional integrity that should create reciprocal relations among likeminded persons.38 Under 
DIRI circumstances, what constitutes the public use of reason—and the informal extension of the 
 
38 Political liberalism rejects a “perfectionist” commitment to public life as a moral 
virtue. Under DIRI circumstances the objection is moot: forgoing a public value as a moral virtue 
results in the death of public life. Hence it is vital for Du Bois to show that deliberative openness 
has an unconditional value, indeed, one that the informal public political culture of the 
segregated African-American community continued to protect on its own initiative. 
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public sphere—has no clear boundaries.  
What is more, often local moral communities protect and advance democratic ideals such 
as autonomy, despite a dysfunctional formal public sphere. In DIRI circumstances, Du Bois 
asserts that deliberative reciprocity often takes the form of racial solidarity among vulnerable 
racial groups in informal or quasi-formal associations in civil society.39 In fact, unjust racist 
coercion often inadvertently strengthens intragroup racial solidarity. Excluded persons come to 
share a sense of mutual respect, trust, and political destiny, and develop a local political culture 
manifest in a shared practical commitment to deliberative reciprocity.40 Thus, for Du Bois, 
victims of coercion need not resign themselves to political irrelevance. 
3. Finally, there is an unresolvable conflict between the value of deliberative openness as 
the discursive vehicle of justice and the innate value of one’s own humanity. Constructivist 
philosophers assume that no such conflict exists: just public institutions protect the equal moral 
worth of persons. But under DIRI the values conflict, often in jarring ways.41 For reasonable 
 
39 Du Bois, Souls, chp. 10; Basevich, Elvira. “W.E.B. Du Bois’s Critique of American 
Democracy in the Jim Crow Era: On the Limitations of Rawls and Honneth,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 27.3 (2019): 318-40. 
40 From 1934 onward, Du Bois controversially favors black self-segregation to cultivate 
deliberative reciprocity among those he trusts and with whose political destiny he identifies: “If 
you do not wish to associate with me, I am more than willing to associate with myself. Indeed, I 
deem it an honor and a privilege to work with and for Negroes.” Du Bois, “Segregation in the 
North,” p. 1244; Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, pp. 696-99. 
41 Rawls thus frees persons from the obligations of justice under deeply nonideal 
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deliberative agents forgo personal security and contend with the prospect of self-sacrifice, if they 
attempt to pursue deliberative reciprocity when most others do not. That is, Booker bothered to 
engage in the first place, presumably after numerous unsuccessful or partially successful 
attempts at mediation as the black Human Rights Commissioner in Monroe County, Indiana. He 
confronts, indefinitely, a conflict between the preservation of his own life and that of democratic 
life. By hoping that the values might one day align, he gestures with Du Bois, “To a hope not 
hopeless but unhopeful.”42  
That self-sacrifice often advances democratic ideals illustrates something crucial about 
democratic politics under DIRI that preoccupies and disturbs Du Bois. The political value of 
autonomy is neither reducible to nor grounded in the innate moral value of the humanity of 
particular deliberative agents.43 In practice, the pursuit of the former often involves the brutal 
destruction of the latter.44 Du Bois struggles to explain how much destruction a group can accept 
 
circumstances. Cf. Barbara Herman’s discussion of risk and sacrifice for the sake of historical 
progress in her Moral Literacy, pp. 147-48. 
42 Du Bois, Souls, p. 141. 
43 For further discussion in contemporary Kant scholarship about why the idea of public 
right (political autonomy) is not reducible to the moral law (moral autonomy), see Horn, 
Christoph. “Kant’s Political Philosophy as a Theory of Non-Ideal Normativity,” Kant-Studien 
107.1 (2016): 89-110; Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political 
Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. pp. 355-88. 
44 Hence in his writings on the St. Domingue Revolution, slave rebellions, and the U.S. 
Civil War, Du Bois is ambivalent about the use of political violence as an instrument of 
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for the sake of the advance of a far-flung democratic ideal.45 This conflict between the values of 
persons and of public life persists so long as risk is a fixed feature of the political culture in the 
public sphere.46 In order to mitigate the conflict as best as one can, one experiments with public 
encounters among those similarly committed to deliberative autonomy. Du Bois’s pragmatic 
conception of political obligation is therefore group-oriented: it aims to cultivate deliberative 
reciprocity among likeminded persons. The more robust and extensive one’s social network in a 
local moral community, the less risk one incurs over time by entering a toxic and dysfunctional 
formal public sphere. One begins by building up a local moral community whose practices 
increase both pressure on the polity at large and the likelihood of one’s very survival. 
 
III. Pragmatic Political Obligations from the Perspective of the Oppressed 
 
I have argued that deliberative openness offers a grounding conception of value in a 
dysfunctional public sphere. In the light of the discussion above, we can appreciate why Du Bois 
asserts that even as one remains committed to deliberative openness when others are not, one 
should be pragmatic about pursuing public encounters, engaging likeminded persons prepared to 
 
historical progress, though he is painfully aware that history is a “slaughter-bench,” as Hegel 
puts it. 
45 Likewise, historians debate whether the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was a pointless 
bloodbath or a necessary assertion of self-respect by Polish Jews. Ultimately neither resistance 
nor resignation stopped Jews from inadvertently becoming the instruments of their own 
systematic destruction. 
46 Du Bois, John Brown, pp. 223-34. 
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recognize one’s humanity and to build deliberative reciprocity.47 One need not become a martyr 
for the prospect of justice. Though reasonable persons uphold deliberative reciprocity when 
others do not, one cannot expect of them suicide by politics.48 Persons thus carry a pragmatic 
political obligation to be deliberatively open. They forge a social network that upholds 
deliberative reciprocity in quasi-formal or informal associations, into which they are often forced 
to withdraw as members of excluded groups. Du Bois explains:  
I tried to say to the American Negro: during this time of frontal attack which you are 
making upon American and European prejudice, and with your unwavering statement and 
restatement of what is right and just, not only for us, but in the long run, for all men; 
during this time, there are certain things that we must do for your own survival and self-
preservation. […] Negroes have no Zion. There is no place they can go today and not be 
subject to worse caste and greater disability from the dominant white imperialistic world 
than they suffer here today [in 1940].49 
 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of Du Bois’s critique is the notion that coerced withdrawal does 
not amount to an exit from public life. For him, that “Negroes have no Zion” cannot mean that 
black Americans have no public voice in spite of the deafening indifference and cruelty of the 
white-controlled polity. After all, what can it mean to protect “pragmatically” the democratic 
ideal of autonomy, when one is excluded—often forcibly—and must instead cultivate ties of 
deliberative reciprocity in one’s local moral community? 
 
47 Cf. Shelby’s conception of pragmatic black nationalism in We Who are Dark: The 
Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. pp. 
243-255. 
48 There is a parallel between the nature of political obligations under DIRI and what just 
war theory argues soldiers and civilians can expect to suffer in wartime. 
49 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, pp. 776-777. Emphasis added. 
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Du Bois’s defense of universal suffrage and the ratification of the 19th Amendment, 
which gave American women the right to vote in 1920, illuminates his pragmatic conception of 
political obligation, capturing the normative force of black deliberative agency under the 
conditions of systematic exclusion.50 He treads a fine line. On the one hand, he aims to vindicate 
the unappreciated sacrifices of black suffragists who facilitated the passage of the 19th 
Amendment; and he grants that winning the right to vote was a meaningful political victory for 
all American women. On the other hand, he condemns black suffragists’ cruel exclusion from the 
white-controlled women’s movement and the latter’s alliance with white supremacist ideology. 
Black suffragists’ persistent disenfranchisement after 1920, however, does not render their 
voices politically irrelevant. Rather, he highlights what historians and philosophers alike are still 
grappling with today: women remained at the heart of the black public sphere—before and after 
1920—and their organizing helped spark the U.S. Civil Rights Movement.51 
The politics of race impacted the alliances that were forged and broken among 
suffragists. White suffragists resented the Reconstruction Amendments that gave black men the 
right to vote in the aftermath of the Civil War. They perceived black suffrage to be a threat to 
their claim to equal citizenship and disparaged black suffrage as “anti-woman.” They often 
invoked white supremacist themes that created a hostile—and dangerous—environment for black 
 
50 Du Bois, Darkwater, chp. 6. 
51 See E.B. Higginbotham. Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black 
Baptist Church, 1880-1920. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994; Morris, Aldon. The 
Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York: 
Free Press, 1986. 
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organizers.52 The NAACP Field Secretary James Weldon Johnson dubbed the year before the 
passage of the 19th Amendment the “Red Summer.” Violent white mobs pillaged black 
communities in Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Elaine, Arkansas. The historian Cameron 
McWhirter writes that there were “at least 25 major riots and mob actions across the country.”53 
“Hundreds of people, most of them black, were killed, and thousands were injured and forced to 
flee their homes.” Many white women used their newfound political power elect to white 
supremacists who celebrated the scourge of lynching for protecting white womanhood against 
the mythical black rapist.54 In her original investigative reporting on lynching, Du Bois’s 
contemporary and occasional collaborator Ida B. Wells-Barnett submits that this tactic by white 
suffragists was an incredibly effective tool for amassing white political power.55 
In this toxic political scene, Du Bois centers the work of black suffragists and their 
sustained efforts at community organizing leading up to—and after—the passage of the 19th 
 
52 Feimster, Crystal. Southern Horrors: Women and the Politics of Rape and Lynching. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. pp. 62-86. 
53 Waxman, Olivia B. “‘It Just Goes On and On’: How the Race Riots of 1919’s ‘Red 
Summer’ Helped Shape a Century of American History,” Time Magazine 29 July 2019: online. 
https://time.com/5636454/what-is-red-summer/ 
54 Feimster, Southern Horrors, pp. 62-86. See also Giddings, Paula J. When and Where I 
Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America. 2nd edition. New York: W. 
Morrow, 1996. 
55 Wells-Barnett, Ida B. Crusade for Justice: The Autobiography of Ida B. Wells. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. pp. 229-30, 345-46.  
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Amendment. For Du Bois, it was vital to underscore that racial restrictions continued to limit the 
ballot and the public moral perception of who is a credible deliberative agent.56 Yet he also 
points to their “revolutionary ideals” that continued to sustain black organizing behind the color 
line. And so, while he supported the passage of the 19th Amendment, he condemned the U.S. 
polity’s failure to heed the “revolutionary ideals” of black suffragists:  
Today the dreams of the mothers are coming true. We still have our poverty […] but we 
have, too, a vast group of women of Negro blood who for strength of character, cleanness 
of soul, and unselfish devotion of purpose, is today easily the peer of any group of 
women in the civilized world. And more than that, in the great rank and file of our five 
million women we have the up-working of new and revolutionary ideals, which must 
have vast influence on the thought and action of this land. For this, their promise, and for 
their hard past, I honor the women of my race. Their beauty […] is perhaps more to me 
than to you, because I was born to its warm and subtle spell; but their worth is yours as 
well as mine.57  
 
Du Bois thus portends that even in their formal exclusion, black women would remain critical, 
though often invisible, political agents. Situating black women’s political agency and their 
contributions to the reconstruction of the informal black public sphere and the formal U.S. public 
sphere is a crucial element of Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice. For it requires us to 
center their evaluative perspective in charting the radical reconstitution of American 
democracy.58   
 
56 Any inclusive reworking of law and public policy signifies as much. At the very least, 
reliable access to the ballot would showcase that the discursive practices of a local moral 
community—and the efforts of black women—have revised the public conception of who is 
considered a reasonable deliberative agent and a legitimate member of the public sphere. 
57 Du Bois, Darkwater, p. 107.  
58 In chapter five, I discuss at length black women’s “veiled” deliberative agency in the 
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IV. Building Zion, Brick by Brick, from the Perspective of the Oppressors 
 
Perhaps Du Bois’s approach to theorizing justice is not quite as formidable and 
daunting—or idiosyncratic—as it might prima facie appear. In charting the impact of DIRI on 
the emergence and exercise of reasonable deliberative agency, Du Bois surveys, in effect, the 
conditions that give rise to a reasonable public political culture with a functional public sphere, 
consistent with the requirements of the universal adoption of the ideal of autonomy. Philosophers 
have sketched numerous philosophical histories of political modernity. For example, Habermas 
emphasizes public discussions in salons that flourished on the eve of the French Revolution. 
Rawls reflects on the historical origin of public reason in the Reformation that bolstered religious 
pluralism and the spread of the liberty of conscience and the freedom of thought.59 I submit Du 
Bois’s approach to theorizing justice complements these philosophical histories of political 
modernity. However, he centers the exclusion of vulnerable groups—and African and Afro-
descendent peoples in particular—as the key obstacle to the rise of political modernity in the 
Americas: 
The concrete test of the underlying principles of the great republic is the Negro question, 
and the spiritual survival of the freedmen’s souls is the travail of souls whose burden is 
almost beyond the measure of their strength, but who bear it in the name of a historical 
race, in the name of this the land of their fathers’ fathers, and in the name of human 
opportunity.60 
 
The “Negro question” alters Du Bois’s understanding of the grounds and the conditions for the 
 
segregated black community.  
59 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xxiv. 
60 Du Bois, Souls, p. 14. 
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emergence of reasonable deliberative agency. From the perspective of a white-controlled polity, 
it must come to recognize the so-called “Negro question” as the central obstacle to democratic 
development and reform. To make matters more difficult, for Du Bois, a history of racist 
coercion patterns habits of public moral perception along racial lines. To wit, public habits of 
judgment are bifurcated by the color line. The dialectical interplay between a reasonable and 
simply plurality is mediated by ties of racial belonging. From the perspective of the black 
historical experience, public institutions are in a legitimation crisis that simply does not 
registered as morally salient for white communities that benefit from white supremacy.61 From 
the perspective of the white-controlled polity-at-large, vulnerable groups are often viewed as 
neither intelligible nor credible. Put another way, public moral knowledge of who is and what it 
means to be a reasonable deliberative agent is profoundly incomplete in the formal public sphere 
that is responsible for the history of racist coercion. Pace Rawls, the public value of deliberative 
openness can neither be taken for granted, nor, pace Kant, derived from the willings of a rational 
agent.62 Ergo, as at it now stands, there is no clear public conception of who is a reasonable 
 
61 The public perception of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the for-
profit prison system, and the police is an excellent illustration of the racialization of public moral 
perception that showcases vastly different views of the legitimacy of these institutions.  
62 In spite of Kant’s claim to the contrary, I reject that our conception of ourselves as 
autonomous moral agents is derivable from our subjective access to a free will. Kant conflates 
the concept of a rational agency with our conception of ourselves as practically free. Most 
Kantians disagree with me, but that is a problem for another day. In any case, for Du Bois, 
developing a public conception of deliberative autonomy is an outcome of social activity. 
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moral person and what such an attitude amounts to, particularly with respect to habits of 
judgment across the color. 
Yet Du Bois takes the incompleteness of public moral knowledge to be an opportunity to 
demonstrate that the advance of moral literacy in the formal public sphere is both accessible and 
a laborious sociohistorical construction, often spearheaded by excluded groups—precisely those 
groups dismissed as ignorant and suspect in the polity-at-large, but who still labor for democratic 
ideals against seemingly impossible odds. And so, Du Bois raises the question: what can the 
successful transformation of the polity-at large mean, given its a longstanding commitment to 
systematic and violent racial exclusion? Du Bois provides a bidirectional, two-pronged 
interpretation of the practical success of the democratic engagement of the excluded. It is 
bidirectional in the sense that it posits two seemingly oppositional strategies to facilitate the 
pragmatic exercise of political power of the excluded that might ultimately succeed in 
transforming the formal public sphere. On the one hand, Du Bois advocates that members of 
excluded groups cultivate deliberative reciprocity among likeminded persons to form a local 
moral community through which persons can engage in joint political action. On the other hand, 
he directly condemns political movements and institutions for their failure to evince reasonable 
and inclusive standards of political judgment. Each prong ultimately aims to exert pressure on 
the formal public sphere and to center the legitimate demands of the excluded. Under DIRI, we 
can appreciate that his bidirectional two-pronged interpretation of practical success illuminates 
that reasonable and excluded deliberative agents are in the process of rebuilding the public 
sphere, teaching the American public how to pick out morally salient features of our social 
reality that contradict the universal ideal of autonomy. 
Thus, even as Du Bois champions the cultivation of deliberative reciprocity among 
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likeminded persons in local moral communities, he condemns the discursive practices of the 
polity-at-large. He pressures the latter to recognize the normative authority of members of 
excluded groups, criticizing the disenfranchisement of black and brown women in particular and 
people of color in general on the basis of their supposed “ignorance” as potential voters.63  
Consider Du Bois’s attack on popular rationalizations for limiting the ballot. In the early 
twentieth century, reactionary critics accused vulnerable social groups of lacking the requisite 
knowledge and experiences to participate in democratic politics—as if white men would best 
protect their interests. He objects, “it is simply the old cry of privilege, the old assumption that 
there are those in the world who know better what is best for others than those others know 
themselves, and who can be trusted to do this best.”64 Not only does he defend the moral literacy 
of the excluded as manifest in their inalienable capacity for deliberative openness, but he argues 
that inclusive democratic engagement leads to the enrichment of public moral knowledge about 
who is, and what it means to be, a reasonable moral person. Autonomous democratic deliberation 
is thus didactic inasmuch as it challenges received conception of who are the people with whom 
one should freely and publicly enter into intersubjective discursive relations. Hence Du Bois’s 
pragmatic defense of democracy introduces new voices into the fold of formal political power. 
Du Bois distinguishes knowledge in general (of letters, industry, and craftsmanship) from 
the moral literacy requisite for democratic engagement, as expressed in the exercise of 
autonomous public judgment.65 He specifies that moral literacy has no empirical conditions 
 
63 Du Bois, Darkwater, pp. 80-81. 
64 Du Bois, Darkwater, p. 81. 
65 ibid., p. 78.  
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whatsoever insofar as each person possesses the moral power necessary to be the master of their 
own lives, even if they or their forbearers were denied access to an education, private property, 
and meaningful employment opportunities. Moral literacy does not entail a technical know-how 
that builds a state as a shipwright builds a ship. One therefore cannot demand of the people 
technical expertise about statecraft and optimal bureaucratic administration as a condition for 
their enfranchisement. Nor does moral literacy for democratic engagement assume expertise 
about arts and letters that elites possess by virtue of an excellent education. Du Bois is an ardent 
critic of polls taxes and literacy tests to restrict suffrage.66 Rather, he argues that all persons 
possess—and can refine—their moral power to find “solutions [for] political problems,” even if 
they lack formal “experience” in the practice of finding such solutions.67 “Liberty trains for 
liberty,” he writes, “Responsibility is the first step in responsibility.”68 That is, “practical liberty 
is a good school.”69 On the one hand, liberty is a “good school” in the sense that the only kind of 
“preparation” one needs is to uphold, in good faith, the attitude of deliberative openness and the 
ideal of autonomy on which it rests. On the other hand, liberty is a “good school” in the sense 
that it rebuffs the shortsightedness of illiberal rogues whose claim to power is contingent on the 
exclusion of others. Democratic politics should, instead, compel one to value the inalienable 
capacity of others to participate in setting together the terms of political rule. Otherwise one 
cannot appeal to a democratic ideal to ground one’s claim to power. By refusing to grant 
 
66 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, chp. 15. 
67 Du Bois, Darkwater, p. 81.  
68 Du Bois, John Brown, p. 236. 
69 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 203. 
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credibility to another as a democratic agent one loses credibility oneself. For democratic 
engagement necessitates challenging the received conception of who are the people with whom 
one must enter into intersubjective discursive relations. One must thus consistently redefine 
one’s political identity as a responsible member of a political community. 
Du Bois’s defense of the moral literacy of the excluded showcases the development of 
the institutional integrity of the public sphere. An excluded group, he claims, “can educate, not 
only the individual unit, but generation after generation, until they [the people] accumulate vast 
stores of wisdom.”70 The local moral communities to which excluded groups belong are in a 
unique position to reflect on their situated knowledge and experiences to demonstrate the 
practical contradiction between social reality and the ideal of a universal moral community of 
ideal legislators. He captures the didactic function of autonomous democratic deliberation for 
transforming the normative character of the formal public sphere. In essence, as political 
judgment gradually extends its universal scope, democratic reason incorporates the “wisdom” of 
the formerly excluded. He thus opines that the “revolutionary ideals” of black suffragists “must 
in time have vast influence on the thought and action of this land.”71  
Increasingly autonomous democratic deliberation adds additional content and values for 
guiding democratic engagement. Though I cannot pursue the matter here, in later chapters I show 
that the attitude of deliberative openness mediates the introduction of all other rationally-binding 
commitments into the public sphere. It sets the practical problems that democratic deliberation 
must solve. The important point for Du Bois is that through deliberative openness one interprets 
 
70 Du Bois, Darkwater, p. 84. 
71 Du Bois, Darkwater, p. 107. 
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one’s own experiences—and the concrete experience of others—from a shareable public 
perspective whose form is universal but whose substantive content and commitments are open-
ended and reflect the particular experience of oppressed social groups. 
The development of democratic reason in the public sphere—the normative character of 
democratic reason—is therefore best viewed as being in medias res: 
Again, to make experience [in democratic politics] a qualification for the franchise is 
absurd: it would stop the spread of democracy and make political power hereditary, a 
prerequisite of a class, caste, race, or sex. […] Today the civilized world is being ruled by 
the descendants of persons who a century ago were pronounced incapable of ever 
developing a self-ruling people. In every modern state there must come to the polls every 
generation, and indeed every year, men who are inexperienced in the solutions of the 
political problems that confront them and who must experiment in methods of ruling 
men. Thus and only thus will civilization grow.72   
 
The “growth” of “civilization” reflects an ongoing unprecedented experiment of persons sharing 
political power with those seldom recognized as credible deliberative agents. Just as deliberative 
agents in a local moral community pragmatically experiment forming intersubjective discursive 
relations, so too must the polity-at-large must experiment in finding a reasonable solution to the 
problem of people living together well. Namely, the public must learn the true value of the 
universal scope of public judgment and thereby refine public moral knowledge of who is, and 
what it means to be, a reasonable moral agent across the color line. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter presents the groundwork of Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice. Du 
Bois identifies the public sphere in Anglo-European states as involving a dialectical interplay 
between the reasonable and the illiberal. Three important implications follow: (1) The ideal of 
 
72 Du Bois, Darkwater, p. 81. 
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autonomy grounds deliberative openness and strives to create a universal moral community of 
ideal legislators by treating all persons as potentially reasonable deliberative agents, including 
illiberal rogues and those who are not formal members of the public sphere. (2) Coerced 
withdrawal from the public sphere does not signify one’s political irrelevance. (3) The ideal of 
autonomy often conflicts with the innate value of humanity. In the light of these implications, I 
defend Du Bois’s pragmatic conception of political obligation that strengthens deliberative 
reciprocity with likeminded others, which often fortifies intragroup racial solidarity and 
eventually comes to transform the normative character of the formal public sphere. There is 
much more work to be done to present Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice, whose 
groundwork I lay here with much excitement. 
 
